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1. INTRODUCTION
The amount of sensitive financial, military and government 
data traffic over the Internet has increased by orders of 
magnitude over the past two decades. Another recent trend is 
the use of mobile channels for such communication. With this 
explosive growth, data security has never been in need of more 
urgent attention from the academic and research community.
Encryption standards like RSA, AES, and authentication 
schemes like MD5 have been the work horses since the 
beginning of this era. Grouped under ‘Computational 
Security’, these time-tested protocols rely on the computational 
intractability of certain operations like prime factoring. But 
new breakthroughs in technology are constantly pushing the 
envelope and the pressure on these protocols is increasing. 
An interesting paradigm is physical layer security, which 
proposes the use of physical properties of communication 
channels to guarantee data security. Physical layer security has 
attracted intense recent research attention with several journals 
dedicating special issues2-4 and even a recent book summarizing 
the developments in the area5.
This tutorial explains a particular security model based on 
wiretap channels. We show how the physical characteristics of 
a practical channel can be exploited to provide an additional 
level of security. Differences in the channel quality between 
the main channel and the wiretapper’s channel can directly lead 
to measurable improvements to the security model. The exact 
amount of data security provided by this model can be measured 
in terms of the equivocation seen by an eavesdropper.
2. THE WIRETAP CHANNEL
Wyner1 proposed a basic framework for secure 
communication in 1975 called the Wiretap channel. The model 
is simple: Alice and Bob are two legitimate users, and Alice 
sends a block of coded data to Bob over a discrete memoryless 
channel (DMC) C1  as shown in Fig. 1. Eve is an Eavesdropper 
illegally tapping into the conversation through another channel 
that will be named C2. An important and vital assumption 
is that C1 is in some sense stronger than C2, and this can be 
guaranteed by the physical nature of the channel and signals. 
The use of a weaker channel for the eavesdropper is the most 
significant difference between conventional cryptography and 
physical layer security. 
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Figure 1. The wiretap channel.
In the wiretap channel, we have twin objectives: 
• Reliability: Bob should be able to decode the information 
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across the channel C1	with	error	rate	approaching	zero	as	
the block length increases. 
•	 Security:	 Eve’s	 information	 about	 the	message	m must 
tend	to	zero	as	block	length	increases.	
	 In	precise	information-theoretic	terms,	Eve’s	uncertainty	
about	 message,	 namely	 the	 equivocation,	 should	 be	
close to the number of message bits. The ideal condition 
is, of course, H(m|Zn) = H(m), where H(.) represents 
information-theoretic entropy i.e. the uncertainty or 
entropy of the message m remains the same in spite of 
Eve’s	observations	Zn.
In order to ensure the above two objectives, Alice and 
Bob	have	 to	make	some	compromise	on	 their	data	 rate.	The	
maximum rate at which the above two objectives can be ensured 
is called the secrecy capacity of the channel pair C1 and C2. If 
we suppose that C2	is	‘degraded’	compared	to	C1, the secrecy 
capacity ends up being the difference of the capacities of these 
channels i.e. capacity(C1) - capacity(C2).	For	the	specific	case	
of C1 being an ideal error-free channel and C2 being a binary 
erasure channel with erasure probability ε, the secrecy capacity 
(as	calculated	in	Wyner’s	paper)	is	ε, which is the fraction of 
bits	that	are	erased	in	Eve’s	observation.
Wyner	 talks	 about	 two	wiretap	 channel	models,	 named	
wiretap-I and wiretap-II. Under the former model, Eve gets a 
random subset of µ bits from the total of n bits transmitted. In 
wiretap-II, the adversary is given the freedom to choose the 
exact subset of bits to be monitored. Obviously, the latter model 
is	significantly	more	challenging	for	the	system	designer.
2.1 Encoding for The Wiretap Channel
It will be informative to compare traditional error correction 
coding with wiretap encoding. A typical error correcting code 
takes a k bit message and encodes it into n bits. The code C 
can be viewed as a subspace of the n-dimensional binary space 
{0,1}n. There is a one-to-one correspondence between message 
words and code words.
This	coding	scheme	is	sufficient	to	ensure	reliability.	But	
to address the Security objective, an unusual one-to-many 
coding	 scheme	 is	 required.	The	wiretap	 coding	model	 takes	
the k bit message and maps it to the entire space of n bits. 
So there are 2(n-k) code words corresponding to each possible 
message. One of these code words is chosen at random and 
transmitted. It is this randomness that is the backbone of the 
wiretap	channel’s	security.
The most attractive part of these schemes is that there are 
few secrets to be kept; Eve can have full knowledge of the 
encoding scheme and its parameters. Also, there are no private 
keys.
2.2 Low density Parity Check Codes
Our	 first	 task	 is	 to	 choose	 a	 suitable	 code	C. An error 
correcting	 code	 can	 be	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 parity	 check	
matrix H whose rows are orthogonal to every code word. In 
symbols,
0,THx x c= ∈                            (1)
It has been shown that a particular class of error correcting 
codes known as low density parity check (LDPC) codes works 
best	 for	Wiretap	 encoding.	 LDPC	 codes	 were	 proposed	 by	
Gallager in his path breaking 1960 thesis7. These are codes that 
have a sparse parity check matrix.
Low density parity check codes have several interesting 
properties.	 First,	 they	 can	 operate	 very	 close	 to	 Shannon’s	
channel capacity. Carefully designed LDPC codes are known 
to	 reach	 within	 0.0048	 dB	 of	 the	 limit	 in	 binary	 Gaussian	
channels. Secondly, every LDPC code family exhibits a 
threshold property over most practical channels. In Gaussian 
channels,	if	SNR*	is	the	signal	to	noise	ratio	(SNR)	threshold	
of an LDPC code, then the code is guaranteed to work with 
high	probability	at	all	SNRs	greater	than	SNR*.
2.3 Coset Encoding Scheme
Let C be an LDPC code with generator matrix G. Like all 
linear codes, C is a subspace of {0, 1}n with 2k elements. A set 
of the form C+e where e is any n-bit word (that may or may not 
be in C), is called a coset of C.	By	the	theory	of	error-correcting	
codes,	 every	 coset	 is	 of	 size	 2k and there are a total of 2(n-k) 
distinct cosets. The cosets partition the n-dimensional space 
into	disjoint	subsets	as	shown	in	Fig.	2.	With	this	backdrop,	we	
proceed	to	describe	the	Wiretap	encoding	scheme:
Alice starts with an (n- k)-bit message m. This is the 
secret	message	 to	be	communicated	 to	Bob.	She	first	finds	a	
basis (let us call it G*) for the complementary subspace of 
C in {0, 1}n. C and its complement C’ together form the full 
n-dimensional	 space	 of	 binary	 numbers: ' {0,1}nC C∪ = .The 
next	step	is	crucial:	Alice	generates	a	k-bit random number u. 
This is a uniform random number generated at run time, and 
neither	Bob,	nor	Eve	is	aware	of	its	value.	Alice	performs	the	
following	calculation	with	it:
[ ]x = m u G
G
∗ 
                
(2)
The vector x above is the code word that is ultimately 
transmitted	 over	 the	 Wiretap	 channel.	 Equation	 (2)	 can	 be	
expanded as x = mG* + uG.	By	definition,	uG is a valid code 
word in C. The actual message m determines a coset of C 
whose	 size	 is	 2k. Alice selects an element from the coset at 
random (recalling that u is random) and transmits it.
Figure 2. Coset encoding.
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2.4 Decoding the Wiretap Channel
As	a	first	approximation,	we	assume	that	the	main	channel	
is	noise-free.	So	Bob	receives	the	code	word	x without errors. 
His goal is to extract the message m, so he performs the 
computation 
HxT =  (mG*+uG)T=H(mG* )T                         (3)
This situation is identical to a code word getting corrupted 
in transmission. The vector uG is the code word, and mG* is 
akin to noise. The product s = H(mG*)T is called the syndrome. 
The syndrome s	uniquely	determines	the	coset	corresponding	
to mG*	and	thus	Bob	has	recovered	the	original	message.
It	is	to	be	noted	that	Bob	never	used	the	actual	value	of	the	
random vector u. This is because the coset is the message; any 
of the 2k	words	in	the	coset	would	serve	the	purpose	equally	
well. 
The	 eavesdropper’s	 aim	 is	 also	 to	 decode	 the	 secret	
message m.	But	as	noted	above,	Eves’	channel	 is	 inferior	 to	
Bob’s	and	she	receives	a	corrupted	version	of	the	codeword	x. 
The random nature of the encoding along with a careful design 
of the code is used to ensure that the corrupted version reveals 
very little or no information about the message to Eve.
2.5 Security of the Wiretap-I Channel and Column 
rank Property
Suppose	 that	Eve’s	channel	 is	a	binary	erasure	channel,	
and she receives only r bits of the transmitted codeword x. The 
syndrome HxT is a linear combination of some columns of H. 
The	columns	corresponding		to	the	’1’	bits	in	x are selected for 
this	summation,	while	the	columns	multiplied	by	the	’0’	bits	get	
nullified.	But	Eve’s	copy	of	x is not complete; her syndrome 
has several ambiguous positions. These are precisely the places 
corresponding to the (n- r) erasures.
It	is	to	be	noted	that	the	whole	idea	of	Wiretap	encoding	
is based on the assumption that we have a source of perfect 
random numbers that is cryptographically secure. If the 
random vector u	 in	Eqn.	(2)	 is	revealed	to	 the	eavesdropper,	
then security of the system can be compromised.
We	will	employ	the	following	useful	property	of	LDPC	
codes:	If	an	LDPC	code	C has length n and threshold η over 
binary erasure channels, then any subset of columns of its 
parity matrix H, chosen independently with probability η, 
will have full column rank with high probability. The result is 
applicable for large values of n, but LDPC codes are usually 
used with block length running into thousands. As a result, 
linear combinations of at least nη columns of H can produce 
2nη  distinct words.
We	will	 use	 the	 following	 theorem	 due	 to	Ozarow	 and	
Wyner:
Theorem 1:	C is an (n, n-k) linear code with generator 
matrix G. Let the columns of G be denoted by {g1, g2, …  gn}. 
The bit positions revealed to the eavesdropper are {b1, b2,… 
br}.  Then the code will be secure, if the corresponding columns 
{gb1, gb2, …  gbr} have full rank.
As an example, let x be a 7-bit word, and let us suppose 
that	Eve	received	the	first	3	bits	correctly.	The	next	4	bits	have	
been	erased	in	the	channel.	We	denote	Eve’s	received	word	as
x = { 1 1 0 * * * * }
From this partial information Eve has to guess which coset 
the message belongs to. If every coset has at least one word 
starting	with	1	1	0...,	then	Eve’s	uncertainty	is	total.	As	there	
are 2(n-k) cosets, each of them has probability of 1/2(n-k) of being 
right	and	the	equivocation	seen	by	the	attacker	is	(n-k) bits.
This	 can	 be	 practically	 verified	 through	 simulation.	
Figure 3 shows an LDPC code belonging to the EGLDPC code 
family. It is a (4095, 3367) code. A 728 bit secret message is 
encoded into 4095 bits and transmitted. The graph plots the 
equivocation	of	Eve	against	the	number	of	bits	revealed	to	her.	
As	long	as	less	than	3367	bits	are	revealed,	the	equivocation	
remains at its maximum value of 728 bits (complete security). 
After	that	point,	the	equivocation	drops	linearly.
Though we have described secrecy in wiretap channels 
using the example of binary erasure channels, these ideas can 
be extended to other channels including the most practical case 
of Gaussian channels.
3. KEy EXChANgE PrOtOCOLS
Shannon6, showed that one time padding (OTP) is an 
effective way to encrypt a message for unconditional security. 
But	OTP	schemes	suffer	from	the	equally	intractable	problem	
of	key	distribution:	if	an	n-bit message needs an n-bit key to 
be securely distributed, then encryption offers no additional 
advantage. So all practical schemes use a much smaller key of 
k bits, k << n, and use some form of pseudo random number 
generator	 (PRNG)	 to	 expand	 the	 key	 to	 the	 necessary	block	
length. 
For example, a block cipher like 3DES or AES can be 
used in chained mode with a counting nonce. This can generate 
a	 sequence	 of	 random	number	 blocks	 using	 a	 small	 seed	 as	
the initial key. Protocols like Fortuna accumulate entropy 
from various sources for the seed, and keep updating the seed 
periodically. Another approach is to use linear feedback shift 
registers	(LFSR)	with	a	true	random	seed	as	the	initial	state	of	
the register.
Many of these algorithms are vulnerable to timing 
attacks and correlation attacks, and there is ample literature 
on countermeasures. This paper will focus mainly on the 
generation and sharing of the initial key between two legitimate 
Figure 3. Security of EG (4095, 3367) code.
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parties	Alice	 and	 Bob,	 while	 keeping	 an	 eavesdropper	 Eve	
completely ignorant of it.
3.1 Key Generation and Reconciliation
Diffie	and	Hellman	showed	in	1976	that	it	is	possible	for	
the legitimate parties to exchange a pair of keys through an 
insecure	channel	and	use	it	for	public	key	cryptography.	But	we	
look	at	a	variant	of	this	technique,	where	no	agreed-upon	public	
or private keys are available to begin with. Instead, the secret 
key is distilled from a larger string of binary digits exchanged 
over	 a	 noisy	 channel.	Alice	 and	Bob	 also	 have	 access	 to	 an	
error-free and authenticated public channel over which they 
exchange a series of messages about the key bits. This process, 
called reconciliation, results in distilling mutually agreed upon 
bits	that	have	sufficient	entropy	to	provide	an	advantage	over	
the	eavesdropper.	We	now	describe	the	above	steps	in	greater	
detail	for	the	Gaussian	Wiretap	channel.
3.2 Key Exchange for a gaussian Wiretap Channel
Figure 4 shows a Gaussian wiretap channel. Alice and 
Bob	are	separated	by	a	Gaussian	channel	with	noise	variance	
Σ2,	while	Eve’s	channel	is	also	Gaussian	with	noise	variance	
σ2.
We	will	suppose	that	Σ < σ,	which	makes	Eve’s	channel	
degraded	in	comparison	with	Bob’s	channel.	This	advantage	is	
exploited in the key exchange protocol. Further, we suppose that 
Alice has a transmit power limitation of P. For the purposes of 
key exchange, Alice generates n i.i.d realisations of a Gaussian 
random variable Xi ~ N(0, P),  i = 1, 2,…n and transmits them 
to	Bob	 through	 the	main	channel.	The	channel	adds	noise	Zi 
that is again i.i.d	Gaussian:	Zi ~ N(0, Σ
2). 
Alice	also	quantises	Xi to r bits of precision and gets an 
r-bit vector [Xi1 Xi2 … Xir]. Each of these r bits are said to form 
a	‘level’.	All	bits	in	a	particular	level	are	grouped	to	form	n-bit 
vectors Qj = [X1j X2j … Xnj],  j=1,2,…r. Using these r level 
vectors, Alice computes r syndromes Sj using a series of parity 
check matrices Hj , j = 1, 2, …  r:
Sj = HjQj
T
The rates of the codes represented by Hj and the 
quantisation	 intervals	 used	 are	 carefully	 chosen	 in	 order	 to	
optimise the mutual information between the received soft 
values	and	the	quantised	bits,	as	explained	later.
Bob	receives	Yi = Xi + Zi,  i =1,2,…n	through	the	Wiretap	
channel and the syndromes Sj, j = 1, 2, … r, without any errors, 
through an authenticated public channel. Note that Eve receives 
Yi’ = Xi + Zi’ where Zi
’ ~N(0, σ2) are i.i.d Gaussian with σ > Σ. 
Since the syndromes are sent on a public channel, Eve also 
obtains Sj , j=1,2,…r without any errors.
 The goal of the communication process is to ensure 
that	Bob	can	recover	the	vectors	Qj , which are r-bit	quantised	
versions of Xi, without any error. The syndromes are sent 
to	 enable	Bob	 to	 perform	 error	 correction.	 Since	 there	 are	 r 
different levels that are intertwined in each received value, we 
will employ a method known as multi-level decoding, which is 
described next.
3.3 Multi Level Decoding with LDPC Codes
The decoder for two levels (r = 2) is shown in Fig. 5. The 
received values Yi, i =1,2,…n and the syndromes Sj = HQj
T, 
j=1,2,…r, are processed at the decoder by levels. As shown in 
Fig.	5,	Level	1	is	decoded	first	using	the	received	values	and	
S1. The result of Decoder 1 and S2 are used in Decoder 2 along 
with the received values. If there are more levels, we continue 
in	a	similar	fashion.	For	the	first	stage	we	assume	that	a priori 
1	and	0	are	equally	probable	for	Xi1.	For	the	subsequent	stages,	
the extrinsic information from stages 1 through (j-1) form the 
a priori	input	LLR	for	stage	j and helps the decoder converge 
with better accuracy.
In general, the vector Qj = [X1j X2j … Xnj]  is decoded at 
Decoder j using the syndrome Sj = HjQj
T (sent on the public 
channel), the received values Y = [Y1 Y2 …Yn] and the previously 
decoded vectors Q1, Q2, …Qj-1.
To describe the decoders in more detail, we will suppose 
that LDPC codes are being used (i.e. Hj are LDPC matrices) and 
the decoders are soft-in, soft-out (SISO). Therefore, Decoder j 
will	output	log	likelihood	ratios	(LLRs)	Lij for the bits Xij given 
the entire received vector Y = [Y1 Y2 …Yn. That is, we have
 
Pr 0
Pr 1
i j
i j i j
(X = |Y)
L =
(X = |Y)
                                           
       (4)
So, if Lij > 0, we decide that
ˆ 0ijX = , and, if Lij < 0, we decide 
ˆ 1ijX =  The input for Decoder j	 is	 the	 LLR	 	 lij for each bit 
Xij given only Y and the outputs of previous decoders Li1, Li2, 
Figure 4. gaussian wiretap channel. Figure 5. Two level decoder.
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After multilevel decoding, assuming the decoder 
converged,	the	receiver	Bob	will	have	correctly	decoded	the	r 
quantised	vectors	Q(X) = {Q1,Q2, …Qr}. Notice that now both 
Alice	and	Bob	have	access	to	this	common	nr-bit string Q(X).
3.5 Privacy Amplification
The common string Q(X)	shared	by	Alice	and	Bob	is	not	
entirely secure. This is because Alice had sent the syndromes 
Sj = HjQj
T over the public channel and this was received by 
Eve as well.
In	 the	 final	 stage	 of	 key	 distribution	 known	 as	 privacy	
amplification,	Alice	and	Bob	agree	upon	a	common	substring	
from the larger binary string Q(X). This forms the ultimate 
secret	key	that	they	use	for	subsequent	PRNG	seed.	Universal	
Hash	 functions	 can	 be	 used	 to	 arrive	 at	 the	 final	 key	 in	 the	
privacy	amplification	phase.
The design of key distribution over a Gaussian wiretap 
channel, described in this section, was largely based on10,11. 
Next, we present the details and results of an experimental 
implementation of this key distribution protocol.
4. SOFtWArE dEFINEd rAdIO
Software	 defined	 radio	 is	 an	 approach	 to	 implement	
radio	communication	modules	like	mixers,	filters,	modulator/
demodulators, etc on general purpose or embedded computers 
through DSP software. They usually employ a minimalistic 
hardware	front	end	with	the	RF	stages	and	ADC/DAC	modules	
and an optional ASIC for high speed computations. The IF 
and baseband processing is delegated to a general purpose 
computer	for	maximum	flexibility	and	control.	The	spectrum	
band, transmit power, antenna directionality, etc. are adaptively 
controlled by software to suit dynamically changing channel 
conditions. This is also the corner stone of cognitive radio that 
enables agile use of the spectrum through environment sensing 
and opportunistic transmission.
Universal	 software	 radio	 peripheral	 (USRP)	 denotes	
a	 family	 of	flexible	RF	hardware	 devices	 that	 are	meant	 for	
software radio applications. It is widely used with the open 
source	GNU	Radio	project13. Most	popular	versions	of	USRP	
are	manufactured	by	Ettus	Research	and	its	principal	National	
… Li,j-1.	 The	 input	 LLR	 lij in the j-th stage is computed as 
follows:
0 1 1 0 1 1
... 1
0 1 1 0 1 1
... 1
0, ... Pr ...
log
1, ... Pr ...
j j j
q0,q1, qj
ij
j j j
q0,q1, qj
f(y | q = q ,q , q ) (q ,q , q )
l =
f(y | q = q ,q , q ) (q ,q , q )
− −
−
− −
−
∑
∑
              (5)
where f(.) represents a suitable probability density function 
(PDF) and Pr(q0, q1 … qj-1) is	 computed	using	 the	LLRs	Li1, 
Li2, …, Li,j-1.
3.4 Quantisation and Code Rates
The	quantisation	levels	used	in	quantising	Xi are chosen to 
maximise the mutual information 
I (Xi1, Xi2, … Xir ; Yi).
For r = 2, the mutual informations  I (Xi1; Yi) and I (Xi2; 
Yij|Xi1)	are	plotted	against	normalised	SNR	(dB)	in	Fig	6	for	a	
two level decoder. As expected, the total mutual information 
approaches	2	bits	for	sufficiently	high	values	of	channel	SNR.
 Each parity-check matrix Hj, j = 1, 2, … r  is chosen such 
that its rate Rj falls within the mutual information between level 
Xij and Yi given Xi1, Xi2, …, Xi,j-1	at	the	chosen	SNR	of	operation.	
Given such rates Rj, a suitable parity-check matrix Hj of rate Rj 
is formed using a standard LDPC code generator.
We	 discuss	 one	 specific	 design	 that	 is	 used	 in	 our	
experiments. For a two-level decoder, with P = 1 and 2∑  = 1/10 
resulting	in	an	SNR	of	10	dB,	we	see	that	the	mutual	information	
of level 1 and level 2 are 0.67 and 0.51 using Fig 6.  So, we choose 
R1	=	0.625	and	R2 = 0.4 to be within the capacity bounds. Then, 
we choose a regular LDPC degree distribution of (3, 8) for H1 
and (3, 5) for H2. These LDPC matrices were constructed for a 
block length of n =1000 and the entire decoder was simulated. 
The	resulting	frame	error	rate	(FER)	performance	of	the	multi-
stage decoder is plotted in Fig. 7.
We	see	that,	as	per	our	design,	the	FER	falls	after	the	target	
SNR	of	10	dB.	This	plot	also	confirms	the	threshold	property	
of LDPC codes. If the block length is increased further, the 
drop	in	FER	after	the	threshold	will	be	more	steep.
Figure 6. Mutual information of two level decoder.
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Figure 7. Frame error rate of two level decoder.
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this study. The preferred native language of the open source 
community is Python, but it is easy to write tight subroutines in 
C/C++ and plug in using the SWIG interface. The current study 
implemented all the multilevel decoding routines in C and the 
decoding	was	performed	offline.
As	noted,	most	of	the	operations	of	the	USRP	are	handled	
in	 software.	 This	 includes	 programmable	 gain	 amplifiers	
for	 the	mother	 board	 input	 (upto	 20dB	 gain)	 as	well	 as	 the	
DSP routines for modulation/ demodulation. Many software 
projects	including	GSM,	CDMA	2000,	IEEE	802.11	(Wi-Fi),	
IEEE	802.16	 (Wi-Max)	 and	LTE	have	 been	 implemented	 in	
software	Defined	radio.	FM	and	DVB	receivers,	Software	GPS	
and	RFID	detectors	can	be	easily	assembled	around	the	USRP.	
Matlab	and	Simulink	also	support	the	USRP.
5. KEy dIStrIbUtION WIth thE USrP
In this section we describe the experiments performed in 
the IIT Madras lab on key distribution protocols using software 
radio peripherals and present the main results. The layout of 
the experimental setup was optimised for easy measurements. 
The	communication	lab	was	rectangular	with	size	11	m	x 5.75 
m and a brick wall partition in the middle (Fig. 9). Standard 
wooden	partitions,	office	furniture	and	PCs	were	present.	The	
room had 4 large grilled windows facing a corridor outside. 
The	 transmitter	was	 centrally	 kept	 at	 a	 fixed	 place	 and	
measurements were made at multiple points in the rooms and 
the corridor.
Instruments14.	The	USRP	has	since	been	deployed	in	diverse	
fields	like	telecom,	radio	astronomy	and	medical	imaging.	
USRP1	 type	devices	 along	with	RFX	2400	Transceiver	
boards were used in a series of experiments with key exchange 
protocols. The rest of the paper describes some of the results.
4.1 USRP Fundamentals
A	 basic	 block	 diagram	 of	 a	 USRP	 device	 is	 shown	 in	
Fig. 8. The main board consists of an FPGA that handles most 
of the operations, along with analog-to-digital and digital-to-
analog	converters	that	operate	at	RF	frequencies.	The	RF	stages	
are on a set of 4 daughter boards mounted on the motherboard. 
The	USRP1	has	slots	for	2	TX	boards	and	2	RX	boards.
Advanced models like N210 have a Gigabit Ethernet 
interface for high bandwidth applications with high speed 
ADCs	and	DACs.	The	current	study	used	the	original	USRP1	
device. It has four 12 bit ADCs operating at 64 MS/s and four 
14 bit DACs at 128 MS/s. The FPGA is an Altera EP1C12 
device. Its has a highly pipelined architecture with a clock 
frequency	of	64	MHz.	The	software	is	implemented	in	Verilog	
using QuartusII. Communication with the host computer is 
through	a	USB2	port.	The	power	supply	is	6V/2A.
The	RFX2400	is	an	RF	Transceiver	board	operating	in	the	
2.3-2.9	GHz	range	capable	of	sourcing	100	mW	output.	TriBand	
rubber	duck	antennas	that	have	a	range	of	2.4	GHz	to	5.8	GHz	
were	used.	Though	the	USRP	can	operate	in	full	duplex	mode,	
the experiment used two	USRPs	in	simplex	mode.	The	FPGA	
has 4 down converters that can handle any of the four ADC 
inputs	 through	 a	 flexible	 routing	 mechanism.	A	 decimating	
low	 pass	 filter	 provides	 I	 and	 Q	 outputs.	 The	 channels	 are	
interleaved	and	sent	to	the	host	through	the	USB	bus.	On	the	
transmit path, up conversion is handled by four AD9862 codec 
chips, with the FPGA providing only interpolation support.
The	ADCs	have	an	analog	input	bandwidth	of	200	MHz,	
which	is	the	nominal	upper	limit	for	the	IF	frequency.	However,	
upto	500	MHz	IF	can	be	handled	if	the	loss	can	be	tolerated.	To	
give	this	flexibility	to	the	designer,	the	USRP	does	not	have	an	
anti-aliasing	filter.
4.2 Software Interface
The	 natural	 platform	 for	 the	 GNU	 Radio	 tool	 chain	 is	
Linux, though it has been ported to other environments like 
Mac	OS	 and	MS	Windows.	The	 open	 source	 graphical	 user	
interface GNU radio companion was extensively used for 
 Figure 8. USRP block diagram.
Figure 9. Experimental setup at IIT-Madras lab.
5.1 Experiment design
The	 base	 station	 was	 fixed	 at	 one	 location	 and	 the	
receiver	was	moved	along	fixed	distance	contours.	The	sender	
transmitted a series of Gaussian distributed random data blocks, 
which	 were	 generated	 in	 MATLAB	 offline	 and	 transferred	
to	 the	 USRP	 board	 for	 transmission.	 The	 symbol	 rate	 used	
was	 12,500	 symbols	 per	 second.	 The	 receive	 USRP	 board	
collected samples of the received baseband waveform with 
an oversampling of 20. These samples were transferred to a 
desktop computer, on which the entire receiver processing was 
done	offline.	Measurements	were	repeated	at	different	locations,	
which corresponded to different values of estimated channel 
SNR.	The	Transmitter	and	Receiver	have	a	programmable	gain	
of	-20	to	0	dB	and	0	to	70	dB	respectively,	which	gives	the	total	
dynamic	range	90	dB.	The	receiver	used	a	training	sequence	to	
perform rudimentary channel estimation and to calibrate itself.
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5.2 Frame Configuration
Every transmitted frame starts with a preamble to assist 
the receiver to lock on to the symbols. As shown in Fig 10. This 
consists of a block of 100 all-1 symbols followed by a block 
of	400	BPSK	modulated	known	symbols.	The	preamble	serves	
four	purposes:	
•		 As	a	 training	 sequence	 to	help	 the	 receiver	 synchronise	
with the transmitter 
•	 To	estimate	the	channel	SNR	
•	 To estimate the attenuation, and 
• Derive a scaling factor for the symbols. 
The payload is a block of 1000 symbols from a Gaussian 
distributed	random	real	number	sequence.
data is transferred to a general purpose computer for further 
signal processing. The PC used for the software radio was an 
off-the-shelf Dell Vostro laptop running Ubuntu Linux 10.04. 
The PC hardware consisted of an Intel Core 2 Duo processor at 
2.1	GHz	and	2	GB	DDR2	RAM.	
In the PC, the following processing is performed. The 
throttle is a buffer used for congestion control, ensuring 
average rate does not exceed sampling rate. This is followed 
by	a	matched	filter	(MF)	module.	The	MF	filter	correlates	the	
received symbols with the transmitted pulse shape. The output 
of the MF continues to be at 250 K samples/s, which is 20 
times oversampled. This is to facilitate timing and carrier phase 
recovery, as described later.
After recovering the clock, the in-phase component is sent 
to	a	file	sink	for	storage	and	mutli-stage	decoding	to	recover	the	
quantised	values.	The	multi-stage	decoder	is	run	on	a	general	
purpose computer, along with the syndrome information, and 
error correction is carried out as described earlier.
5.5 timing recovery
The most challenging part of the implementation was 
symbol	synchronization.	The	ADC	in	the	receiver	operates	on	
a free running clock, which is non-coherent with the transmitter 
clock. The offset between the two clocks needs to be estimated 
and corrected for, in order to decide the exact sampling instant. 
This	 will	 help	 us	 get	 the	 best	 possible	 SNR	 and	 minimise	
ISI.	Timing	 recovery	 is	 handled	 using	 the	modified	Mueller	
and Muller (MM) method13. Our implementation used an 
interpolation	 filter	 at	 20	 samples/symbol.	 The	 step	 size	 for	
updating successive phase estimates was 0.001.
Since M & M algorithm is sensitive to carrier phase 
offset,	we	used	a	Costas	loop	stage	to	first	recover	the	carrier	
phase13. It is a pair of phase locked loops (PLLs) operating in 
inphase	and	quadrature	modes.	The	Costas	loop	approach	was	
preferred	over	feed-forward	techniques,	because	of	its	inherent	
track-and-hold ability. This helps in self-correcting the phase 
and	frequency	of	the	received	carrier.	The	BPSK	preamble	in	
Figure 11. transmitter schematic.
Linux PC
Figure 12. receiver schematic.
Linux PC
Figure 10. Transmission frame configuration.
5.3 transmitter
The	 experimental	 setup	 consisted	 of	 a	 pair	 of	 USRP1	
software radio peripherals from Ettus research. Each consisted 
of	an	RFX	2400	model	daughter	board	operating	in	the	band	
2.3	GHz	-	2.9	GHz.	The	original	symbol	rate	was	1/T	=	12.5	
K	samples/sec	implying	a	Nyquist	band	width	of	1/2T	as	the	
minimum	cut	off.	But	 since	 this	places	 impractical	demands	
on	the	receiver	filter	design,	we	over-sample	 the	symbols	by	
a	factor	of	20	and	then	filter	 it	at	35%	extra	bandwidth.	Our	
implementation	had	401	filter	taps	spread	over	the	duration	of	
20 samples (±10T). Since the symbol rate Rs = 12500 and the 
filter	roll	off	factor	β =	0.35,	we	see	that	the	bandwidth	required	
is 0.5 Rs(1+β)	=	8.438	Hz.
Pulse shaping is done by a matched pair of root raised 
cosine	(RRC)	filters	at	the	transmitting	and	receiving	ends.	The	
RRC	filter	was	chosen	for	its	simplicity	and	the	protection	it	
offers	against	inter	symbol	interference	(ISI).	The	final	output	
rate was 12.5 K symbols x 20 samples = 250 K samples/s, 
which is safely within the operating range of the digital to 
analog	converter	(DAC)	in	the	USRP.
In our experiment we kept our transmitter gain at its 
maximum	0	dB	and	transmitter	power	is	varied	by	changing	a	
multiplying	constant	(Fig.	11)	for	convenience.	The	RF	carrier	
frequency	was	set	to	be	2.4752	GHz.
5.4 receiver
A schematic of the receiver is shown in Fig 12. Input data 
to	 the	USRP	 in	 the	 receiver	 in	Fig.	12	arrives	at	 a	 sampling	
rate of 64 M samples/s. Even though the transmitted symbols 
were purely real, carrier phase offset introduces a spurious 
e jθ factor, resulting in a phase rotation. For this reason the 
receiver operates in the complex domain with a pair of analog 
to	 digital	 converters	 (ADCs)	 within	 the	 USRP	 operating	 at	
128	M	samples/s.	After	RF	processing,	down	conversion	and	
decimation	in	the	FPGA	in	the	USRP,	signal	samples	of	the	two	
I and Q streams are interleaved and passed to the PC through a 
high	speed	USB	2.0	cable	at	the	original	250	K	samples/s.	This	
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may	 be	 expected,	 there	 are	 equiprobable	 contours	 around	
the transmitter with the central region representing high 
probability of successful key recovery. For instance, in Fig. 16, 
we see that the success probability for key distribution falls to 
very low values even at locations inside the same room as the 
transmitter. Such a scheme can be used for key distribution, 
which is secure from eavesdroppers outside of the room.
the frame was used as the training signal to lock the loop. The 
Costas	loop	bandwidth	was	adjustable	from	π/100	to	2π/100.	
In	 practice	 the	 built-in	 Oscillator	 in	 USRP1	 has	 frequency	
accuracy	upto	3	ppm.	So	when	we	operate	in	2.4	GHz	range	
we	get	a	frequency	offset	of	around	10	kHz.
The	 receiver	 gain	 was	 fixed,	 and	 the	 transmitter	 gain	
was kept at its maximum, but transmitted power is varied by 
varying the multiplying constant and the measurements were 
repeated at different locations. The receiver power level was 
calibrated	by	sending	a	known	symbol	sequence	at	constant	Tx	
power	and	bench	marked.	A	pilot	signal	consisting	of	all	1’s	
was used to sync the start of transmission. The sample rate was 
20	samples/symbol.	After	calibrating	the	SNR	reference	point,	
we	send	the	Gaussian	symbol	sequence.	The	receiver	uses	the	
pilot to perform rudimentary channel estimation and uses the 
calculated	SNR	value	for	decoding.	The	Carrier	frequency	at	
which	the	experiments	were	conducted	is	2.4752	GHz.
Input bit error probabilities were calculated by comparing 
hard-decoded values at the receiver with the transmitted 
symbols. The experiment was repeated and the resulting error 
surface is shown in Figs. 13-16 by varying transmit power. 
Transmitter	 position	 is	 showed	 in	 the	 plots	 by	 ’Tx’.	 The	
code	rates	are	0.625	and	0.4	and	 the	block	size	of	1000	was	
used. Each plot shows the probability of successful recovery 
of the key against the physical placement of the receiver. As 
Figure 13. Success rate representation of frames decoded when 
multiplication factor = 0.3.
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Figure 14. Success rate representation of frames decoded when 
multiplication factor = 0.2.
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Figure 16. Success rate representation of frames decoded when 
multiplication factor = 0.1.
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Figure 15. Success rate representation of frames decoded when 
multiplication factor = 0.15.
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6. CONCLUSION
We	 looked	 at	 the	physical	 layer	 security	model	 for	 key	
exchange protocols. Studies indicate that the difference in 
channel	qualities	of	the	legitimate	parties	and	the	eavesdropper	
can be used to exchange a new random key constructed at 
run time. Use of a reliable public channel for key negotiation 
enables us to arrive at a secret key about which the eavesdropper 
has	 negligible	 knowledge.	We	 made	 detailed	 measurements	
using	the	USRP	device	at	the	physical	layer	and	key	exchange	
protocols	at	the	application	layer.	The	results	confirm	that	the	
effect of the physical channel on the secrecy of communication 
is indeed very pronounced. This knowledge can be used in 
designing	 communication	 systems	 with	 verifiable	 security	
specifications.	One	possible	future	direction	of	work	would	be	
to use this set up for a study of ad-hoc wireless networks to 
design	energy	efficient	and	secure	coding	schemes.
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